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From Standpoint Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression 
Briana Toole 
Forthcoming in Hypatia 
Abstract: Standpoint epistemology is committed to a cluster of views that pay special attention 
to the role of social identity in knowledge acquisition. Of particular interest here is the situated 
knowledge thesis. This thesis holds that for certain propositions p, whether an epistemic agent is 
in a position to know that p depends on some non-epistemic facts related to the epistemic agent’s 
social identity. In this paper, I examine two possible ways to interpret this thesis. My first goal 
here is to clarify existing interpretations of this thesis that appear in the literature but that are 
undeveloped and often mistakenly conflated. In so doing, I aim to make clear the different 
versions of standpoint epistemology that one might accept and defend. 
 
This project is of significance, I argue, because standpoint epistemology provides helpful tools 
for understanding a phenomenon of interest as of late - epistemic oppression. My second goal is 
to provide an analysis that makes clear how each of the readings I put forth can be used to 
illuminate forms of epistemic oppression.  
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The landscape of epistemology is changing. Epistemologists are no longer solely concerned with 
questions regarding what conditions are necessary for knowledge or how knowledge is 
transmitted; they have instead shifted their attention to concerns regarding our epistemic 
practices and how those practices might oppress. Epistemic oppression, the unwarranted 
exclusion or obstruction of certain epistemic agents from the practices of knowledge production 
(Dotson 2012, 2014), has been the focus of much work produced by feminist epistemologists in 
the last decade, and rightly so. If the aim of epistemology is to bring us closer to truth, then any 
practice which threatens to subvert this aim ought to be thoroughly investigated.<1> In this 
paper, I argue that in order to understand, address, and eliminate epistemic oppression, we must 
appeal to the conceptual tools made available by standpoint epistemology.  
 
Broadly speaking, standpoint epistemology is committed to the thesis that some non-epistemic 
features related to an agent’s social identity make a difference to what an epistemic agent is in a 
position to know (Hartsock 1983; Haraway 1988; Harding 1993; Wylie 2003; Kukla 2006; Rolin 
2009; Intemann 2010; Crasnow 2013). Precisely which features of an epistemic agent’s social 
identity are of concern, and the way in which those features make a difference to what a person 
knows, is what I aim to explore further in this paper.  
 
The standpoint thesis is important but controversial. It owes its controversial nature to the fact 
that it stands in tension with those versions of traditional epistemology that suggest that it’s 
exclusively epistemic features (such as truth, evidence, reliability, and so on) that make a 
difference to what a person is in a position to know. And, as I have already alluded, it is an 
important thesis because it sheds light on a phenomenon that emerges in our epistemic practices: 
epistemic oppression. 
 
Though some standpoint epistemologists have gestured at the relationship between standpoint 
epistemology and epistemic oppression (Crasnow 2009; Rolin 2009), the connection has not 
been explicitly developed. I thus take up that project here. However, in order to make clear the 
role standpoint epistemology plays in illuminating this phenomenon, we must first do some 
important work to clarify the landscape. The thesis of standpoint epistemology has been 
characterized in a number of diverse (and sometimes, conflicting) ways. And so, to better 
understand epistemic oppression, we must first be clear about the thesis under discussion. My 
goal here is to carve out the conceptual space so we have a clearer sense of what standpoint 
epistemology is, how it is to be defended, and to what ends it can be applied.  
 
I begin in section 1 by analyzing what I take to be the bare, or general, standpoint thesis. I next 
explore how we can fill in this bare reading to offer additional versions of the thesis. In section 2 
I examine the historical material and feminist material readings, offered by George Lukács and 
Nancy Hartsock, respectively. In section 3 I develop a social reading, gestured at by Miranda 
Fricker and Gaile Pohlhaus, among others. Then, in section 4 I analyze how these readings can 
be usefully applied to illuminate some (though not all) well-known forms of epistemic 
oppression. 
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Section 1: Standpoint Epistemology - A Primer  
Feminist standpoint epistemologies are comprised of three core theses: situated knowledge, 
epistemic privilege, and achievement. The situated knowledge thesis will be my primary focus, 
as it is here where many standpoint epistemologies diverge. 
 
I define the situated knowledge thesis as follows: 
 
(S) For certain propositions p, whether an epistemic agent is in a position to know that p 
depends on some non-epistemic social facts about that agent. 
 
This thesis, as I have articulated it here, does not specify which non-epistemic social facts make 
a difference to what the epistemic agent is in a position to know. However, of primary concern to 
the standpoint epistemologist is the relationship between one’s position of marginalization or 
dominance in a social system and what one can know (or fail to know) given that social 
positioning.  
  
Let me say a bit about how this thesis should be understood. I mean to defend the claim that 
certain non-epistemic facts related to one’s social identity may make a difference to what 
evidence one has, whether one recognizes evidence as such, what claims one entertains, and so 
on. One’s social identity may ‘open one up’ to evidence in ways that aren’t modeled by 
traditional epistemologies.<2> And it is this sense in which one’s social identity, a non-epistemic 
feature, makes a difference to what one is in a position to know. Or so I hope to show. 
  
The situated knowledge thesis, as I define it, rests on a distinction between epistemic and non-
epistemic features. This is, I have suggested elsewhere, part of the controversiality of the 
thesis.<3> While I will not here offer a precise definition of when a feature is epistemic, 
traditional epistemologies take epistemic features to be those features that are truth-conducive - 
that is, features that make a belief more likely to be true. Paradigmatic examples give us a strong 
grasp of this category of features: examples include evidence, justification, reliability, and so on. 
Standpoint epistemologies, by contrast, stipulate that features beyond these, features that are 
traditionally taken not to be truth-conducive, may make a difference to whether an epistemic 
agent knows some proposition or not. This is the claim I hope to motivate here.  
  
As aforementioned, the situated knowledge thesis is but one of a cluster of claims to which the 
standpoint epistemologist is committed. Standpoint epistemologies are additionally committed to 
the claims that some epistemic advantage can be drawn from the position of powerlessness 
(epistemic privilege), and that knowledge accessible from a particular social location is not 
given, but must be struggled for (achievement).  
  
The epistemic privilege thesis goes hand in hand with the achievement thesis. According to the 
epistemic privilege thesis, one is not epistemically privileged in virtue of occupying a particular 
social location. Rather, epistemic privilege may be achieved through the process of 
consciousness-raising.<4> Consciousness-raising functions so as to help members of a socially 
oppressed group critically examine the relationship between one’s social situatedness and one’s 
oppression (or oppressive role) within a social system (Ruth 1973; MacKinnon 1991).  
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Both the epistemic privilege and achievement theses have been discussed elsewhere in the 
literature.<5> As such, these latter two theses will not be my primary focus. I have merely 
offered this discussion as a useful primer to any reader unfamiliar with the robust standpoint 
literature.  
  
In what follows, I aim to accomplish two tasks. First, I’ll briefly discuss the more familiar 
historical material and feminist material versions of the situated knowledge thesis. Though these 
forms of the thesis have largely fallen out of fashion, I’ll suggest these readings are useful to 
illuminate a form of epistemic oppression recently introduced into our theorizing – epistemic 
exploitation (Berenstain 2016). Second, I’ll develop a social reading of the standpoint thesis that 
has been gestured at in the literature, but has not been fully sussed out. 
 
Section 2: Something Old - Material Readings of (S) 
Standpoint epistemology can trace its genesis to the works of Karl Marx (1867) and Friedrich 
Engels (1932), George Lukács (1923), and their analyses of the proletarian standpoint. The non-
epistemic feature of significance in their analysis is that of material labor. Thus, I render this 
reading of (S) as follows: 
 
(SM) For certain propositions p, whether an epistemic agent is in a position to know that p 
depends on that agent’s relationship to material labor. 
 
This reading is general enough to capture both the historical material reading and the feminist 
material reading it inspired.  
 
  
The historical material account of standpoint epistemology explores the relationship between a 
society’s mode of production and what one is in a position to know. The mode of production of 
interest to these accounts is capitalism. This account suggests that one’s class position within a 
capitalist system - that is, whether one is a member of the capitalist or the laboring class - is 
relevant to what one is in a position to know. As Hartsock writes, “material life (class position in 
Marxist theory) not only structures but sets limits on the understanding of social relations”, such 
that one’s relationship to labor can be expected to have consequences for knowledge (Hartsock 
1983, 286). 
  
Feminist material accounts, rather than examining the relationship between knowledge and one’s 
social class (under capitalism), instead shift their analysis to the relationship between knowledge 
and gender (under capitalist patriarchy) (Smith 1974; Hartsock 1983; Jaggar 1983; Harding 
1991).  Feminist material accounts accuse historical material accounts of neglecting to attend to 
the unique ways in which women’s labor - which is often unrecognized as such – is central to the 
system of reproduction (Young 1980; Hartsock 1983).    
  
Where historical material accounts investigate the emergence of a proletarian standpoint, 
feminist material accounts argue for the emergence of a distinctly feminist standpoint. Much like 
class sets limits on knowledge, feminist materialists argue that the institutionalized division of 
gendered labor under patriarchy structures social relations, thereby structuring our understanding 
of those social relations. 
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Many feminist materialists have developed their accounts by exploring the ‘double shift’ women 
must perform (Hochschild and Machung 1989). That is, women participate in the reproduction of 
labor power by turning commodities into consumable goods - the production of food, clothing, 
and other such tasks (Rubin 1975). However, women also engage in a second, unpaid shift at 
home, performing duties that allow for the maintenance of capitalism by reproducing workers. 
Taken literally, women produce a commodity in that they have children who will go on to 
become a part of the workforce. Moreover, they perform duties that sustain workers – preparing 
meals, cleaning, doing laundry, caring for family members, and a litany of other feminine-coded 
work. 
  
A shortcoming of feminist materialism, one that I take to be responsible for the general decline 
of the view in feminist literature, is that it is too narrow in focus. These accounts neglect to 
attend to the myriad forms of labor which women are expected to perform, but which does not 
directly contribute to the (re)production of capital.  
 
2.1 Beyond Reproductive Labor 
Reproductive labor does not exhaust the category of gendered labor which women are expected 
to perform. Yet, feminist material accounts have failed to adapt to reflect the ways in which 
women’s roles have evolved over time.<6> Another shortcoming of feminist material accounts is 
their inadequacy in accounting for the labor performed by people of color, especially women of 
color. These accounts can be redeemed, I suggest, in two ways: first, by exploring labor which is 
coded as feminine, but does not directly or essentially involve the reproduction of capital<7>; 
second, by demonstrating the relevance of these accounts to understanding epistemic oppression. 
I will focus on the first task here and return to the second in section 4.  
  
I suggest here that emotional and cognitive labor, performed disproportionately by women and 
people of color, are within the purview of feminist materialism. Mirjam Müller (2018) defines 
emotional labor as a form of gender-specific exploitation that involves  
 
…listening to the other’s worries, sensing that something is going on and providing space for 
the other to talk about it, keeping in touch, remembering important things in the other’s life 
etc. The currency of this type of emotional labour includes care, respect, attention, affection 
or empathy. (Müller 2018, 8)<8> 
 
This form of labor is one which is unevenly distributed among the genders and races, and which 
women and people of color perform to a disproportionate degree. In part, Müller argues, this is 
because of gendered assumptions which view women as suited to these tasks because they are 
nurturing by nature. And, as I will soon show, this is also due to the expectation that academics 
of color perform diversity-related service.  
  
Kate Manne (2018) also explores the unequal division of emotional labor along the lines of 
gender. Manne argues that because goods like “attention, affection, admiration, sympathy, sex, 
and children (i.e., social, domestic, reproductive, and emotional labor); also mixed goods, such 
as safe haven, nurture, security, soothing, and comfort” are distinctively coded as feminine, 
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women are viewed as obligated to provide these goods to men, and men see themselves as 
entitled to the provision of these goods (Manne 2018, 130).  
  
Beyond emotional labor, women also find themselves beholden to performing cognitive labor. 
Cognitive labor includes the invisible mental work that involves organizing, keeping track of, 
and delegating tasks that need to be accomplished in order to manage one’s household, office, 
and so on (Walzer 1996). Cognitive labor thus includes tasks like noticing you’re low on toilet 
paper, that the kids have upcoming doctors’ appointments, that laundry needs to be done in 
preparation for a trip, and other such errands. While men increasingly perform these tasks, it is 
still the case that women are expected to keep mental track of what has to be done and thus are 
responsible for delegating.  
  
As both Müller and Manne note, women are adversely impacted by the expectation that they 
perform this kind of labor. For instance, in academia, women researchers are disproportionately 
asked to advise students, engage in additional service requirements (like serving on committees), 
and provide support for male colleagues (Guarino and Borden 2017; El-Alayli, Hansen-Brown, 
Ceynar 2018). This impedes their career advancement because they have less free time than do 
their male counterparts (Müller 2018, 9). Further, women are punished when they fail to provide 
these services to which others believe they are entitled (Manne 2018, 111). 
  
This is doubly true as it applies to people and women of color. Research shows that heavier 
service burdens are placed on people and women of color than their white male colleagues to 
perform diversity-related work (Joseph and Hirshfield 2011; Nair 2014). Moreover, studies show 
that people of color perform this work to a disproportionate degree, leaving them less time to 
spend on work that contributes to tenure. Consequently, the taxation of this ‘invisible labor’ 
ultimately contributes to the attrition of people of color within the academy (Social Sciences 
Feminist Network Research Interest Group 2017).  
  
Feminist material accounts of the standpoint thesis must take into account these forms of labor. 
These forms of labor are demanded of women and people of color under the white supremacist 
capitalist patriarchy, which views dominantly-situated agents as entitled to the emotional and 
cognitive labor that marginalized agents provide. These forms of labor are, in many cases, prior 
to the reproduction of labor that feminist materialists investigate, such as housework. That is to 
say, women and people of color are able to contribute to these systems of reproduction by first 
participating in the emotional and cognitive labor necessary for these systems to operate.  
  
These forms of labor also result in different bodies of knowledge, given that the labor is divided 
along the lines of gender and race. Women of color, for instance, are better positioned than their 
white, male colleagues to know about the needs of students from low-income and minority 
backgrounds (such as mentorship and advising) because they are the ones attending to tasks 
involving those students (Steele 2010, esp. ch 2).  
  
Though material accounts of standpoint epistemology are useful as we think about our lives as 
they are structured around labor, this is but one facet of the human experience. The narrow focus 
of these accounts prevents us from considering broader elements of our social experiences, 
outside and beyond work, which might also impact what we know. As such, I will now take up 
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the social reading of standpoint epistemology, which explores the relationship between 
knowledge and one’s social experiences. 
 
Section 3: Something New – A Social Reading 
Beyond exploring the impact of labor relations on knowledge, some feminist epistemologists are 
also concerned with the more general social conditions and relations in which epistemic agents 
are situated (Anderson 1995; Fricker 1999; Pohlhaus 2011; Dotson 2012). Other accounts of 
standpoint epistemology should focus more broadly, then, on the social experiences that socially 
marginalized knowers or groups share in virtue of their position of marginalization. As this 
reading is underdeveloped, I will spend considerably more time here developing this account. 
  
Gaile Pohlhaus (2011) has argued that marginalized groups develop a body of conceptual 
resources so as to understand the experiences they have in virtue of their marginalization.<9> As 
such, I will cash this reading of the standpoint thesis out in terms of the conceptual resources one 
develops and utilizes as a result of the social position one occupies: 
 
(SS) For certain propositions p, whether an epistemic agent is in a position to know that p 
depends on the conceptual resources possessed by that agent. 
 
This reading is meant to capture the social version of (S), in which one’s social experiences (and 
the conceptual resources developed to understand those experiences) make the difference to what 
a person is in a position to know. Before I explore how a standpoint emerges on this account, 
first let me say a bit about conceptual resources. 
 
3.1 Conceptual Resources  
Gaile Pohlhaus writes that these resources are tools epistemic agents use for understanding and 
evaluating their experiences. These resources include language, concepts and their associated 
criteria for sorting. Importantly, these resources “do not stand independently of experience” 
(Pohlhaus 2011, 718, italics in original). Rather, as epistemic agents, we employ these resources 
to make sense of our experiences, and when our conceptual resources are inadequate to that task, 
we reform and revise those resources as necessary. Thus, conceptual resources are not stagnant 
but are subject to change as epistemic agents see fit.  
  
Conceptual resources play an important epistemic role in directing our attention, in organizing 
our thought, and in structuring our reasoning. As such I will argue that these resources have 
important consequences for knowledge. This is especially so if, as I will show, the conceptual 
resources an epistemic agent has depend, in some cases, on her social experiences. To defend this 
claim, I turn now to work from Miranda Fricker on epistemic injustice.  
  
Fricker has argued that epistemic agents are marginalized when they are excluded from meaning-
generating, or interpretative, practices. A meaning-generating practice is one that guides, shapes, 
or governs our way of thinking about things. For instance, legal scholarship governs what sort of 
acts we think of as unlawful. But, because women, for example, were formerly excluded from 
these practices, we neglected to consider and regulate the sorts of oppressive behaviors to which 
women are sometimes subjected - among these, sexual harassment, date rape, and marital rape.  
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Like Fricker, Pohlhaus argues that the exclusion of certain epistemic agents from participation in 
these meaning-generating practices has resulted in the marginalization of these agents. These 
agents are marginalized, she claims, because they lack the conceptual resources required to 
understand the experiences they have.<10> Fortunately, Pohlhaus and Fricker both argue that 
marginalized epistemic agents, seeing the inadequacy of the available conceptual resources, can 
develop a new body of resources with which to understand their experiences.<11>  
  
Consider, as an example, the concept of ‘colorism’. To my knowledge, Alice Walker first 
introduced this term, defining colorism as “prejudicial or preferential treatment of same-race 
people based solely on their color” (Walker 1983, 290-291). In particular, colorism involves 
discrimination against, or preferential treatment of, certain people because of their proximity to 
whiteness. This includes, for instance, preferring lighter skinned black people to darker skinned 
ones. But it might also include, for example, discounting the narratives of lighter skinned black 
people or refusing to consider them members of the black community.  
  
I first experienced colorism as a senior in high school, though at the time I did not have the 
conceptual resources needed to understand my experience. A college recruiter from a 
historically-black college/university (HBCU) visited to offer me a scholarship. But upon meeting 
me, he didn’t review the offer with me; instead, he handed me a packet with information and 
immediately departed. I later gathered that it is unusual for a college recruiter to behave in this 
way, and I inferred that what ultimately best explained what happened was that he was surprised 
(and perhaps, disappointed) by the fact that I am a fairly light-skinned biracial woman.  
  
At the time, I knew that there was something unnerving and hurtful about the experience. But, as 
I did not possess the concept for colorism, I did not fully understand what had occurred, or why. 
It wasn’t until many years later, when I acquired the concept, that I recognized this as an instance 
of colorism. Learning this concept threw into sharp relief an experience that had been somewhat 
vague for me until then.  
 Moreover, learning this concept helped me to recognize other instances of colorism that I 
had previously overlooked. For instance, I began to notice that when black actresses are featured 
on the cover of magazines, they are often whitewashed.<12> Still further, it appears that more 
roles are made available for lighter-skinned black actresses than darker-skinned actresses.<13> 
And lighter-skinned actresses, models, and singers appear on magazine covers more often than 
their darker-skinned peers.<14>  
  
The development of the concept for ‘colorism’ better helps us attend to a phenomenon that was 
otherwise uninterrogated. This concept goes beyond ‘racism’, which merely involves 
discrimination based on race, and is meant to capture a more nuanced form of tone-based 
discrimination whereby people are rewarded for presenting as white, and ostracized when they 
fail to. It therefore captures a wide range of experiences that ‘racism’ will make obscure or 
opaque.  
  
There are a number of other conceptual resources that have been developed by marginalized 
communities to attend to the unique aspects of their social experiences. Examples include 
‘misogynoir’, as coined by Moya Bailey (2013), which describes the particular form of racialized 
sexism that black women face; the term ‘microaggression’, which captures the subtle forms of 
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discrimination that people of color and women experience daily (Sue 2010); and as Miranda 
Fricker has noted, ‘sexual harassment’, a concept that allowed women to better understand and 
identify the workplace harassment to which they were subjected.  
  
I argue that the development of these resources depends on the social experiences that we have. 
Women of color experience misogynoir when they are accused of being overly angry or overly 
sexual as compared to other women; Latinx-individuals experience a microaggression when they 
are routinely asked where they are really from; and women experience sexual harassment when 
their bodies are sexualized in the workplace. 
  
That such resources were previously unavailable, but needed to describe these experiences, is 
what ultimately leads to their development. Moreover, the usefulness of these concepts is 
evaluated by their ability to fulfill this need. Thus, while a conceptual resource is developed to 
fill some gap in our conceptual understanding, these resources only travel if they are found 
useful by those who are similarly situated.<15> 
  
Marginalized groups need terms that enable them to make sense of these experiences. These 
resources allow marginalized knowers to understand what they are experiencing and to attend to 
similar experiences in the future.  
  
Dominantly-situated knowers, who do not have these experiences, will not need these resources. 
Thus, the conceptual resources we develop will often depend on the social experiences that we 
need to describe. Consequently, I suggest that marginalized knowers and dominantly-situated 
knowers, because they have different social experiences, will develop a different body of 
conceptual resources. If an epistemic agent does not have a particular conceptual resource, it will 
be difficult for them to notice or attend to the fact picked out by that resource.  
  
To illustrate, a dominantly-situated knower who lacks the concept of colorism may fail to realize 
that this is what I experienced in the example described above. In fact, they may fail to see that 
anything off-color happened at all. Or, it may strike them as an ordinary occurrence that warrants 
no further investigation.  
  
Of course, even when dominantly-situated knowers come to learn of these conceptual resources, 
there may still be an issue of uptake. While newly developed conceptual resources may become 
intercommunally shared, dominantly-situated knowers may be initially reluctant to adopt the 
resources developed by marginalized communities. In part, this is because dominantly-situated 
knowers may suspect that the newly-developed concept picks out, or attends, to nothing 
(Pohlhaus 2011). As such, there are whole parts of social reality that marginalized knowers are 
well-poised to investigate and analyze, and that dominantly-situated knowers may ignore 
entirely.  
  
Conceptual resources are but one part of the social standpoint, however. Work must be done, 
still, to explain how a social standpoint emerges. Let me turn to that task now.  
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3.2 A Social Standpoint 
As I said earlier, feminist epistemologists who offer a social account of the standpoint thesis shift 
their analysis from one’s relationship to labor to the social experiences a knower (or group) has 
as a consequence of their marginalization. Consequently, a standpoint emerges, in part, as a result 
of the shared social experiences of a particular marginalized group. Additionally, as I suggested 
above, the emergence of a standpoint depends on that marginalized group developing the 
conceptual resources necessary to understand their social experiences.  
  
A standpoint may emerge in several stages. The first stage occurs when a group of people share 
that they have had a similar social experience, and recognize that this experience is one they 
have because of some aspect of their social identity. As an example, consider a group of black 
men and women who confide in each other that they have been excluded from certain events or 
groups because they are darker skinned, or have been subject to greater punishment or harsher 
treatment than their lighter-skinned peers, even when they engage in the same sort of behavior. 
This group will come to realize that this is an experience they all share, and that it is an 
experience they share because they are dark skinned.  
  
This is the stage of consciousness-raising. Consciousness-raising, applied to this example, 
involves dark skinned black people coming to the realization that there are experiences they 
share just in virtue of the fact that they are darker skinned. It thus involves moving beyond the 
realization that 1) they are all dark skinned and 2) that this is an experience they all happen to 
share. That is to say, it requires that they realize that it is an experience they share in virtue of 
their skin tone.  
  
The second stage involves naming this experience. This requires developing the concept, if one 
does not exist already, to appropriately capture the experience they share. Thus, we see the 
development, for instance, of the term ‘colorism’ to name the experience this group shares as a 
result of being dark skinned. Equipped with this concept that names their social experience, 
members of this group are well positioned to notice other instances of colorism. 
  
We might ask how this account differs from the material accounts developed above. In part, my 
task here has been to show that these are distinct accounts that have not properly been 
distinguished in the literature. The social account of the standpoint thesis differs fundamentally 
from the material reading in the following respects.  
  
First, while both versions of the standpoint thesis will share as a common assumption that certain 
relationships structure our understanding, they differ with respect to which relationships they 
take to do the structuring.  For material accounts, epistemic agents understand the world through 
their relationship to labor. Thus, my understanding of the world is structured in part by the fact 
that I am a laborer. The social account, by contrast, will examine how we understand the world 
from an embodied perspective – as individuals who are raced, sexed, gendered, and so on.   
  
Second, while the social account depends on the development of conceptual resources for the 
emergence of a standpoint, the material account does not. In part, this is because we all bear 
some relationship, however minor, to labor. As such, the conceptual resources needed to 
understand labor are readily available. That is to say, the resources that allow women and people 
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of color to understand their activities as labor are available. The same is not true for social 
experiences, for which the conceptual resources needed for understanding are largely developed 
with the experiences of the dominant in mind. 
  
Third, and finally, the locus of epistemic oppression will differ on each account, as well as the 
method for dismantling this oppression. Materially-based epistemic oppression occurs not 
because one lacks the conceptual tools to understand one’s oppression, but rather because those 
conceptual tools are unjustly applied. Socially-based epistemic oppression, by contrast, happens 
because one is without the conceptual tools needed to understand and communicate one’s 
experiences of oppression. I expand on this further in section 4.  
 
Section 4: Applications of Standpoint Epistemology 
I have endeavored in the previous sections to establish two points. First, I argued that whether an 
epistemic agent is in a position to know some proposition in the social domain will depend on 
some non-epistemic facts related to the agent’s social identity. Second, I argued that one’s 
relationship to labor and one’s social experiences (and the concepts developed to understand 
those experiences) are two such non-epistemic social facts that impact the production and 
acquisition of knowledge.  
  
The project of exploring the relationship between social situatedness and knowledge is 
interesting in and of itself. But, it is also a necessary project if we are to understand how and why 
the phenomenon of epistemic oppression arises.  
  
Following Kristie Dotson, I define epistemic oppression as the “persistent epistemic exclusion 
that hinders one’s contribution to knowledge production”, where epistemic exclusion is 
understood as “an unwarranted infringement on the epistemic agency of knowers” (Dotson 2014, 
115). Epistemic oppression occurs when some group (or members of some group) suffers some 
form of epistemic injustice in a systematic way. I will focus here on three epistemic injustices 
discussed in the literature: hermeneutical injustice, willful hermeneutical ignorance, and 
epistemic exploitation.  
  
A hermeneutical injustice is one in which a marginalized knower’s “social experience remains 
obscure and confusing, even for them” because those experiences are excluded from collective 
understanding (Fricker 1999, 208). To illustrate, my inability to recognize my experience with 
the college recruiter as an instance of colorism is a hermeneutical injustice that occurred because 
I lacked the term for ‘colorism’.  
  
Willful hermeneutical ignorance, on the other hand, occurs when a dominantly-situated knower 
refuses to acknowledge or use the conceptual tools developed by marginalized knowers and, as 
such, fails to understand or misinterprets parts of the world (Pohlhaus 2011). This happens, for 
instance, if, when I try to share with someone my experience of colorism, they refuse to accept 
that colorism is a real phenomenon and so dismiss my interpretation of an event as an instance of 
colorism.  
  
Lastly, epistemic exploitation occurs “when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to 
produce an education or explanation about the nature of the oppression they face” (Berenstain 
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2016, 570) According to Berenstain, epistemic exploitation is oppressive because it is “marked 
by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor” (ibid). As an 
illustration, epistemic exploitation occurs when, for instance, someone asks me about my 
experiences of colorism, but then expresses skepticism that my experiences really happened as I 
have described, or instead tries to explain it away.  
  
Below, I will argue that hermeneutical injustice and willful hermeneutical ignorance can be 
understood using the social reading of the standpoint thesis, and that epistemic exploitation can 
be understood using the material reading of the thesis. 
 
4.1 Epistemic Oppression and the Social Reading 
There’s a clear sense in which hermeneutical injustice and willful hermeneutical ignorance are 
tied to the social reading of (S). Thinking about standpoint epistemology in terms of conceptual 
resources, and the relationship between a knower’s social location and the conceptual resources 
she employs, helps to make clear why these forms of epistemic oppression occur.  
  
First, it will help to distinguish between intercommunally shared epistemic resources and 
intracommunally shared epistemic resources. A pool of resources is intercommunal when those 
resources are shared both within and across groups. By contrast, intracommunal resources are 
those resources that are primarily shared within a given community of interlocutors.  
  
Intercommunal resources have largely been influenced by dominantly-situated knowers. In part 
because, as I discussed earlier, marginalized knowers are largely excluded from the meaning-
generating practices in which we develop new conceptual resources. The result is that our 
intercommunal conceptual resources are often not suited to make sense of the experiences of the 
socially marginalized. 
  
Prior to the development of intracommunal conceptual resources needed to understand these 
experiences (e.g. sexual harassment, colorism, and so on), marginalized groups will be utilizing 
the resources of the dominant standpoint. Those resources, which were not developed with the 
social experiences of the marginalized in mind, will not be useful to marginalized groups as they 
attempt to interpret their social experiences. This results in a hermeneutical injustice. 
  
According to Fricker, hermeneutical injustice occurs when a person’s “social experience remains 
obscure and confusing, even for them” because those experiences are excluded from the 
collective understanding (Fricker 1999, 208). Thus, on Fricker’s view, hermeneutical injustice 
occurs when a knower is unable to make sense of some aspect of one’s world because they have 
been excluded from playing a part in the collective understanding. Thus, one’s experiences are 
obscured, even from one’s self, because the interpretative resources necessary to make sense of 
that social experience have not yet been developed.  
  
To illustrate, Fricker points to a memoir from Susan Brownmiller that details what we today 
name sexual harassment. Brownmiller recounts the experience of Carmita Wood – an employee 
in the Cornell department of nuclear physics – and a group of students who discover that they 
have all had similar experiences of being groped by men while in their workplace.<16> 
Brownmiller describes the women’s decision to have a “speak-out in order to break the silence 
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about this”, only to realize that the “‘this’ they were going to break the silence about had no 
name” (Brownmiller 1990, 281; quoted in Fricker 2007, 150).  
  
According to Fricker, the existing hermeneutical resources left a “lacuna where the name of a 
distinctive social experience should be” (Fricker 2007, 150-151). As a result, these women 
lacked a proper understanding for what we are now easily able to identify as sexual harassment. 
They were thus wronged, in their capacity as knowers, in that they were prevented from 
understanding a significant part of their social experience.  
  
It is because (SS) reveals that our conceptual resources are not independent of our social 
experiences that we are able to see the way in which marginalized groups – whose experiences 
are not reflected in our intercommunal conceptual resources – suffer a hermeneutical injustice. 
Of course, epistemic injustice does not cease once hermeneutical injustice is eliminated, as the 
work still remains for those resources to be received within the larger social world. Thus, even 
when hermeneutical injustices are largely addressed, marginalized groups may still be subject to 
willful hermeneutical ignorance as they attempt to communicate their experiences to dominantly-
situated knowers.  
  
Willful hermeneutical ignorance occurs after marginally situated knowers have developed their 
own conceptual resources. Willful hermeneutical ignorance occurs when two conditions are met. 
First, marginally situated knowers have developed conceptual resources such that they are able 
both to understand and communicate their experience to others. And second, these conceptual 
resources are dismissed by dominantly-situated knowers, thus rendering unintelligible the claims 
made by marginally situated knowers.  
  
Consider, as an illustration, the concept of ‘marital rape’. Until epistemic agents began to use the 
conceptual resources necessary to understand marital rape, many failed to recognize that a rape 
victim’s perpetrator could be their spouse. As such, we failed to afford these victims protections 
against this sort of abuse until well into the 1990s (Ryan 1995). 
  
The situatedness of the dominant knower will not make salient those features of the world that 
the marginalized knower’s conceptual resources attend to. As a result, the dominant knower can 
use this fact to preemptively dismiss the knowledge claims of a marginalized knower, as well as 
to dismiss the conceptual resources required to understand those knowledge claims. This happens 
because the resources the marginalized group is using will appear to the dominantly-situated 
knower to “attend to nothing at all, or make something out of nothing” (Pohlhaus 2011, 722). 
This occurs particularly because those resources will be drawing attention to features that are not 
within the experienced world of the dominantly-situated knower.  
  
Consequently, dominantly-situated knowers may dismiss the conceptual resources developed 
from the perspective of marginalized standpoints before learning to use them. When a marginally 
situated knower’s conceptual resources and knowledge claims are dismissed in this way, the 
knower is subject to willful hermeneutical ignorance. 
  
In both the case of hermeneutical injustice and willful hermeneutical ignorance, we see that 
marginalized knowers are obstructed in their capacities as knowers. This obstruction, again, is 
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due to the inadequacy of the prevailing conceptual resources, either to understand the social 
experiences of marginalized groups, or to allow for marginalized groups to effectively 
communicate those experiences to dominantly-situated knowers.  
  
Next, let me turn to the material reading and its applications to epistemic exploitation.  
 
4.2 Epistemic Oppression and the Material Reading 
Just as the epistemic reading of the standpoint thesis served to investigate hermeneutical injustice 
and willful hermeneutical ignorance, the material reading of the thesis makes clear why 
epistemic exploitation occurs. Epistemic exploitation is a form of epistemic oppression in which 
marginalized knowers are expected to educate dominantly-situated knowers about their 
oppression. Epistemic exploitation might involve, for instance, a woman of color being asked to 
explain to white women why it is inappropriate for them to touch her hair. This work is 
exploitative, Berenstain argues, because it is often unrecognized and uncompensated, and places 
an unfair burden on those who are already marginalized. 
  
I argue that both emotional and cognitive labor constitute forms of epistemic exploitation. Rather 
than thinking of emotional and cognitive labor as being exploited in service of some other form 
of oppression, I argue that in and of themselves, these forms of labor are exploitative. Including 
emotional and cognitive labor in this category captures the notion that, in performing this sort of 
labor, the mental energy of women and people of color is diverted away from their own projects, 
goals and interests in the service of someone else’s. Emotional and cognitive labor, like other 
forms of epistemic exploitation, “[maintain] structures of oppression by centering the needs and 
desires of dominant groups” (Berenstain 2016, 570).  
  
Material accounts of standpoint epistemology investigate the role of material conditions (and the 
way in which we organize our lives around those conditions) in shaping inquiry. In particular, 
material accounts examine capitalism, and I have suggested, the capitalist patriarchy. Primarily, 
this is because capitalism and the capitalist patriarchy serve to legitimize, or justify, the material 
conditions they bring about. I suggest that capitalism and the capitalist patriarchy perform this 
function through a number of means. In particular, I will focus here on the role of schemas and 
legitimizing myths.  
 
Virgina Valian writes that a schema is a  
 
…mental construct that…contains in schematic or abbreviated form someone’s concept about 
an individual or event, or a group of individuals or events. It includes the person’s or group’s 
main characteristics, from the perceiver’s point of view, and the relationship among those 
features. (Valian 1998, 103)  
 
Gendered schemas, for instance, depict women as nurturers and caregivers, and men as warriors 
and providers (Haslanger 2008). 
  
Legitimizing myths, by contrast, are social narratives that serve to justify and maintain the 
position of dominant groups in a social hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto 1999). Such myths attempt 
to naturalize social hierarchies by treating these hierarchies as naturally mandated. They further 
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“[indicate] how individuals and social institutions should allocate things of positive or negative 
social value” and serve as explanations for how the world is (Prato, Sidanius, Stallworth, and 
Malle 1994, 741). For example, they may justify existing systems of inequality by indicating that 
inequality is due to the innate inferiority of some groups compared to others (e.g. White 
nationalism, social Darwinism, etc.). Legitimizing myths include, for instance, racism and 
sexism, which provide a moral justification for discrimination along the lines of race and gender.  
  
While schemas function so as to shape our expectations, aid in the formation of generalizations, 
and make sense of the social world, legitimizing myths serve to justify the social world as 
structured. In a sense, legitimizing myths justify our schemas by suggesting that those schemas 
reflect natural social arrangements. Schemas, in turn, justify the maintenance and replication of 
unequal social relations such that the world matches our expectations of it.<17>  
  
As Roland Barthes writes, “What the world supplies to myth is an historical reality…and what 
myth gives in return is a natural image of this reality” (Barthes 1957, 142). What Barthes means 
by this is that myth takes something historical and gives it the appearance of being ahistorical, 
apolitical, and universal.  
  
Consider, for instance, that our historical reality is one in which women have occupied roles 
traditionally afforded a lower social status – as nurses, wives, mothers, and so on. The 
occupation of these roles is justified by schemas that frame women as emotional, subjective, life-
giving, and nurturing (Valian 1998; Haslanger 2008). These schemas are in turn legitimized by 
social myths that characterize women as, by nature, caring and giving (e.g. biological sexism and 
biological determinism). Thus, the gendered division of labor under capitalist patriarchy is 
justified by appealing to these schemas and myths.<18> 
  
Capitalism and the capitalist patriarchy justify the material conditions they produce by the 
construction and maintenance of these schemas and legitimizing myths. They thereby justify the 
material oppression produced as a consequence. Legitimizing myths and schemas work together 
to engender a sort of blindness that inures us to the oppression produced by capitalism and the 
capitalist patriarchy. Schemas and myths thus render invisible the oppressive features of 
capitalism and the capitalist patriarchy to those who benefit from it.  
  
Material accounts of the standpoint thesis draw our attention to how capitalism and the capitalist 
patriarchy structure social relations. They thereby demand that we interrogate the oppressive 
social systems they enact and maintain.  
  
Material accounts successfully accomplish this by making central the role of practical productive 
interactions in producing knowledge. Social scientists Jack Spapeen and Leonie van Drooge 
define productive interactions as 
 
…exchanges between researchers and stakeholders in which knowledge is produced and 
valued that is both scientifically robust and socially relevant. These exchanges are mediated 
through various ‘tracks’, for instance, a research publication, an exhibition, a design, people 
or financial support. The interaction is productive when it leads to efforts by stakeholders to 
somehow use or apply research results or practical information or experiences. Social 
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impacts of knowledge are behavioural changes that happen because of this knowledge. These 
changes may regard human well-being (‘quality of life’) and/or the social relations between 
people or organizations. (Spapeen and van Drooge 2011, 212, italics in original) 
 
Thus, productive interactions yield information or experiences that are socially impactful in 
improving social relations.  
  
This analysis of productive interactions is too narrow for my purposes. Practical productive 
interactions, I suggest, are broader so as to include those exchanges analyzing practical 
experiences and social roles. In particular, practical productive interactions are those interactions 
in which one attends to the type of labor in which they are engaged and the relation between that 
labor and one’s social relationships of production. Social relationships of production are those 
relationships we must enter into in order to survive, produce, and reproduce our means of life.  
  
In Marxist terms, practical productive interactions thus involve investigating how one’s social 
positioning (as a laborer) is the result of a specific set of historical conditions. Namely, it 
involves realizing that one is a laborer in relation to a capitalist under a set of social conditions, 
i.e. capitalism. Practical productive interactions thus require that we critically interrogate the 
conditions of one’s labor and what structures make those conditions possible, i.e. the supporting 
schemas and myths.  
  
This point also holds for the feminist materialist. Practical productive interactions involve an 
examination of how one’s status as, for instance, a caregiver (physically or emotionally) exists 
under a set of social conditions in which men are entitled to that care, i.e. patriarchy. Thus, we 
see that emotional and cognitive labor is labor demanded of women and people of color, and 
owed to men, given the social relationships of production under the capitalist patriarchy.  
  
Like productive interactions, practical productive interactions yield knowledge that is socially 
impactful. In practical productive interactions, however, the knowledge produced is knowledge 
of the schemas and legitimizing myths that are taken to justify one’s oppression. Practical 
productive interactions thus require a reassessment of the schemas that have been taken for 
granted even by those occupying marginalized social positions.  
  
A dominantly-situated knower is unlikely to have such a practical productive interaction, both 
because they aren’t expected to engage in these forms of labor, and because they have come to 
represent these inequalities as reflecting nature. Moreover, the social relationship that 
dominantly-situated knowers stand in is that of beneficiary of the labor of others. For instance, 
the capitalist stands in relation to capital goods; men stand in relation to emotional caregiving. 
Thus, there is no need for them to consider the work that goes into the production of that good, 
so long as the good is produced.  
  
In the case of epistemic exploitation (and emotional and cognitive labor) marginalized knowers 
are obstructed from recognizing their labor as labor, and from sharing knowledge of this fact 
once they acquire it. This occurs because capitalism and the capitalist patriarchy make this labor 
invisible to the dominantly-situated, and justify it by appeal to legitimizing myths and schemas. 
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As these tools are successful to the extent that they seem to ‘naturalize’ inequalities, material 
accounts undermine these tools by questioning the legitimacy of these claims.  
 
Section 5: The Value of Standpoint Epistemology 
Epistemic oppression has long been a feature of our existing epistemic practices. This oppression 
has been neither subtle nor hidden, merely obscured from our understanding. My aim has been to 
show that standpoint epistemology is useful in that it gives us the tools needed to understand a 
practice that was previously occluded. 
  
In the previous sections, I discussed various forms of epistemic oppression, and explored how 
each form can be illuminated by versions of the standpoint thesis. I argue that it is by appealing 
to the standpoint epistemologist’s project that these forms of epistemic oppression are revealed.  
  
Epistemic oppression occurs, in large part, because marginalized knowers know some social 
facts that dominantly-situated knowers can’t, or find difficult, to know. As a result, dominantly-
situated knowers tend to discount the knowledge claims of marginalized knowers. In order to 
interpret certain cases as instances of epistemic oppression, we first need an epistemological 
framework that acknowledges that, and establishes how, socially marginalized knowers come to 
have a body of knowledge that dominantly-situated knowers lack (or struggle to access). 
Standpoint epistemology provides such a framework. The task before us is to construct 
additional readings of the general thesis that enable us to understand forms of epistemic 
oppression that are not captured by the readings heretofore provided.  
 
Notes 
Thanks to Sinan Dogramaci, Kristie Dotson, Louise Antony, and Sally Haslanger for many 
helpful conversations and suggestions. Thanks, as well, to audiences at the University of Texas at 
Austin and the University of Toronto for their insightful questions and feedback. I would also 
like to note that the anonymous referees for this paper were incredibly helpful and encouraging, 
and I appreciate their sincere engagement. 
 
1. For interpretations and defenses of the dictum that ‘belief aims at truth’, see Railton (1994) 
and Velleman (2000). 
2. By traditional epistemologies, I mean ‘S-knows-that-p’ epistemologies. For more, see Code 
(1995, esp. ch 2). 
3. For a more thorough examination of the tension between standpoint and traditional 
epistemologies, see Toole (ms). 
4. Consciousness-raising is somewhat under-theorized in discussions of feminist epistemology. 
As such, it is an open question whether consciousness-raising is sufficient for epistemic 
privilege, or if there are other routes by which such privilege may be achieved. 
5. Defenses of the epistemic privilege thesis can be found in Hartsock 1983, Collins 1986, 
Wylie 2003, and Rolin 2009. The achievement thesis has been discussed in Ruth 1973, 
Harding 1991, and MacKinnon 1991, to name but a few. 
6. For more on this, see Collins (1986). 
7. One could, of course, argue that these forms of labor do make the reproduction of labor 
possible, but this is not essential to their performance. That is to say, we can imagine cases in 
which this labor does not contribute to the production of capital. We may perform emotional 
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labor for our friends, for instance, but it’s difficult to see how, in doing so, we have 
contributed to the reproduction of capital. 
8. See also Arlie Hochschild (1985). 
9. Pohlhaus refers to these as epistemic resources, but I will refer to these as conceptual 
resources so as to avoid the implication that these resources are epistemic features. 
10. This is what Miranda Fricker (1999) refers to as a hermeneutical injustice. 
11. Miranda Fricker used the work of Susan Brownmiller and the case of Carmita Wood to argue 
that women developed the concept of sexual harassment to fill a void in the existing 
conceptual lexicon. 
12. Taylor Gordon, “8 Cases Where A Black Celebrity Was Whitewashed For A Magazine 
Cover or Ad Campaign”, Atlanta Black Star, February 19, 2015, 
https://atlantablackstar.com/2015/02/19/8-cases-where-a-black-celebrity-was-whitewashed-
for-a-magazine-cover-or-ad-campaign/2/. 
13. Tiffany Onyejiaka, “Hollywood’s Colorism Problem Can’t Be Ignored Any Longer”, Teen 
Vogue, August 22, 2017, https://www.teenvogue.com/story/hollywoods-colorism-problem-
cant-be-ignored. 
14. Cherry Wilson, “Colourism: Do light-skinned black women have it easier in show-biz?”, 
BBC News, June 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-44229236. 
15. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer at Hypatia for drawing my attention to this point.  
16. Although Fricker fails to note this fact, it is important to acknowledge that Carmita Wood is 
a black woman, as gendered racism (e.g. the view of black women as hypersexual; see 
Crenshaw 1991) is relevant to her experience of sexual harassment and to her understanding 
of that experience. 
17. One might point out here that schemas are conceptual, and so, to understand and dismantle 
material oppression seems to rely on some conceptual apparatus. I suggest that schemas 
function as conceptual roadblocks that foreclose classifying certain activities, largely those 
performed by women and people of color, as labor. But again, this is due not to the 
unavailability of conceptual resources, but to the unjust application of existing resources. 
Thus, to dismantle material oppression does not require the development of new conceptual 
recourses, but that we ensure that existing conceptual resources are applied more justly. 
18. The same can be said of racial stratifications. As is well known, the use of Africans as slaves 
preceded the belief that blacks were intellectually and morally inferior. That blacks are 
thought to be intellectually and morally inferior was used later to justify social relations that 
had already been brought about (Alexander 2010, esp. Ch 1). Thus, we see that our historical 
reality (the racial caste system) was justified by the myth that blacks are irrational, impulsive, 
and so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
References 
Alexander, Michelle. 2010. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness. The New Press. 
Anderson, Elizabeth. 1995. Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense. Hypatia 
10(3): 50–84. 
Bailey, Moya. 2013. New Terms of Resistance: A Response to Zenzele Isoke. Souls 15(4): 341–
343. 
Barthes, Roland. 1957. Mythologies. Annette Lavers (trans.), Noonday Press, 1972. (All page 
references are to the 1972 edition).  
Berenstain, Nora. 2016. Epistemic Exploitation. Ergo 3(22): 569-590. 
Brownmiller, Susan. 1990. In Our Time: A Memoir of Revolution. Dial Press.  
Code, Lorraine. 1995. Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations. Routledge.  
Collins, Patricia Hill. 1986. Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of 
Black Feminist Thought. Social Problems 33(6): 14–32. 
Crasnow, Sharon. 2009. Is Feminist Theory a Resource for Feminist Epistemology? An 
Introduction. Hypatia 24(4): 189-192.  
Crasnow, Sharon. 2013. “Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity. Philosophy 
Compass 8(4): 413-423.  
Crenshaw, Kimberle Williams. 1991. Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence against Women of Color. Stanford Law Review 43(6): 1241-1299. 
Dotson, Kristie. 2012. A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. Frontier 33(1): 
24–47.  
Dotson, Kristie. 2014. Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression. Social Epistemology 28(2): 115–
138. 
El-Alayli, Amani, Ashley A. Hansen-Brown, and Michelle Ceynar. 2018. Dancing Backwards 
 in High Heels: Female Professors Experience More Work Demands and Special Favor 
 Requests, Particularly from Academically Entitled Students. Sex Roles: 1–15. 
Fricker, Miranda. 1999. Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 29(sup1): 191–210. 
Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford 
University Press. 
Guarino, Cassandra M., and Victor M. H. Borden. 2017. Faculty Service Loads and Gender: Are 
Women Taking Care of the Academic Family? Research in Higher Education 58(6): 672–
694. 
Haraway, Donna. 1988. Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege Partial of Perspective. Feminist Studies 14(3): 575-599. 
Harding, Sandra. 1993. “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong Objectivity”?” In 
Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter. Routledge.  
Hartsock, Nancy 1983. “‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically 
Feminist Historical Materialism”. In Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on 
Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, eds. Sandra 
Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka. Reidel Publishing Company. 
Haslanger, Sally. 2008. Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason 
(Alone). Hypatia 23(2): 210–223. 
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 1985. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. 
University of California Press. 
 19 
Hochschild, Arlie Russell, and Anne Machung. 1989. The Second Shift: Working Families and 
the Revolution at Home. Penguin. 
Intemann, Kristen. 2010. 25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are 
We Now?. Hypatia 25: 778-796. 
Jaggar, Alison M. 1983. Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Joseph, Tiffany D., and Laura E. Hirshfield. 2011. “Why Don't You Get Somebody New to do 
it?” Race and Cultural Taxation in the Academy. Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(1): 121-
141.   
Kukla, Rebecca. 2006. Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge. Episteme 3(1): 80–
95. 
Lukács, Georg. 1923. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Rodney 
Livingstone (trans.), Merlin Press, 1971. (All page references are to the 1971 edition.). 
MacKinnon, Catherine A. 1991. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Harvard University 
Press. 
Manne, Kate. 2018. Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Oxford University Press. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1932. From Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. 
In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch. (All page 
references are to the 2001 edition).  
Marx, Karl. 1867. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Ben Fowkes (trans.), Penguin, 
1976. (All page references are to the 1976 edition.). 
Müller, Mirjam. 2018. Emotional Labour: A Case of Gender-Specific Exploitation. Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: 1–22. 
Nair, Shelia. 2014. Women of Color Faculty and the ‘Burden’ of Diversity. International 
Feminist Journal of Politics 16(3): 497 – 500.  
Pohlhaus, Gaile. 2011. Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory Of Willful 
Hermeneutical Ignorance. Hypatia 27(4): 715–735. 
Pratto, Felicia, James Sidanius, Lisa M. Stallworth, and Bertram F. Malle. 1994. 
  Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political 
Attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67(4): 741–763. 
Railton, Peter. 1994. Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief. Philosophical Issues 5: 71–93. 
Roberson, Debi, Jules Davidoff, Ian R.L. Davies, and Laura R. Shapiro. 2006. Colour Categories 
and Category Acquisition in Himba and English. In Progress in Colour Studies, eds. 
Nicola Pitchford and C. P. Biggam. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Rolin, Kristina. 2009. Standpoint Theory as a Methodology for the Study of Power Relations. 
Hypatia 24(4): 218-226. 
Rubin, Gayle. 1975. The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex. In Toward 
an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna Reiter. Monthly Review Press. 
Ruth, Sheila. 1973. A Serious Look at Consciousness-Raising. Social Theory and Practice 2(3): 
289–300. 
Ryan, Rebecca M. 1995. The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption. Law & 
Social Inquiry 20(4): 941–1001. 
Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. 1999. Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social 
Hierarchy and Oppression. Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, Dorothy. 1974. Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology. Sociological 
Inquiry 44(1): 7–13. 
Social Sciences Feminist Network Research Interest Group. 2017. The Burden of Invisible Work 
 20 
in Academia: Social Inequalities and Time Use in Five University Department. Humboldt 
Journal of Social Relations 39(39): 228–245. 
Spaapen, J., and L. Van Drooge. 2011. Introducing 'Productive Interactions' in Social Impact 
Assessment. Research Evaluation 20(3): 211–218. 
Steele, Claude M. 2010. Whistling Vivaldi: How Stereotypes Affect Us and What We Can Do. 
W.W. Norton & Company. 
Sue, Derald Wing. 2010. Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Race, Gender, and Sexual 
Orientation. Wiley.  
Toole, Briana. (ms). Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology.  
Valian, Virginia. 1998. Schemas That Explain Behavior. In Why So Slow?: The Advancement of 
Women. MIT Press. 
Velleman, J. David. 2000. On the Aim of Belief. In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford 
University Press. 
Walker, Alice. 1983. In Search of Our Mothers' Gardens: Womanist Prose. Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
Walzer, Susan. 1996. “Thinking About the Baby: Gender and Divisions of Infant Care. Social 
Problems 43(2): 219–234. 
Wylie, Alison. 2003. “Why Standpoint Matters”. In Science and Other Cultures: Diversity in the 
Philosophy of Science and Technology, eds. Robert Figueroa and Sandra G. Harding. 
Routledge. 
Young, Iris. 1980. Socialist Feminism and the Limits of Dual Systems Theory. Socialist Review 
10(2/3): 169–188.  
